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A Risk Analysis of Adjusted Gross
Revenue-Lite on Beef Farms
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This study evaluates the Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite (AGR-Lite) whole-farm adjusted
gross revenue insurance program on net farm income risk using panel data from 49 southeast
Kansas beef farms. On average for the group, but not each individual farm, AGR-Lite reduces
the mean and standard deviation of net farm income, raises the average minimum, and lowers
the average maximum observations of the net income distribution. Thirty-four farms (69%)
received at least one indemnity payment. Stochastic efficiency with respect to a function
reveals that AGR-Lite is preferred by 18 of the farm managers (37%) when an upper bound
on the risk-aversion coefficient is used.
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Crop and livestock insurance transfers produc-
tion risk to insurance providers who are rein-
sured by the Risk Management Agency (RMA).
This study examines the effectiveness of a rel-
atively new whole-farm revenue insurance
product, AGR-Lite, on net farm income risk for
a group of beef farms using farm-level data.
RMA deemed the AGR-Lite-type coverage was
a necessary addition to their portfolio of in-
surance products because livestock and many
minor fruit and vegetable crops had no or only
limited coverage provided by traditional in-
surance products.
The Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA)
of 2000 allowed the development of federally
reinsured livestock products. Before the en-
actment of ARPA, livestock remained a sector
effectively excluded from RMA insurance
programs. Livestock Risk Protection (LRP), a
federally reinsured livestock product for swine,
fed cattle, and feeder cattle, was approved by
RMA in 2001. LRP is designed to protect
producers against market prices falling below
some predetermined coverage price. Livestock
Gross Margin (LGM) insurance became avail-
able in 2006 for cattle and in 2007 for swine
and dairy. LGM protects gross margin, which
is livestock market value minus feed costs.
Producers receive indemnities equal to the dif-
ference between actual gross margin and guar-
anteed gross margin if positive. RMA has
limited the aggregate national maximum lia-
bility (effectively the maximum number of
contracts) for the livestock products and this
limits the number of producers who may buy
coverage. Many of the contracts also limit the
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size of an operation that may buy effective
coverage, whereas crop insurance has no limits
on the number or size of operations that may
purchase coverage.
Adjusted gross revenue (AGR) became the
first revenue product to insure a percentage of
average gross revenue for the entire farm in
2001. AGR provides coverage under one policy
for multiple agricultural commodities. A
further innovation, Adjusted Gross Revenue-
Lite (AGR-Lite), was introduced in 2003.
AGR-Lite is whole-farm revenue insurance,
which provides protection against low reve-
nue resulting from natural disasters causing
production losses and commodity market fluc-
tuations that affect revenue. Most farm-raised
crops, animals, and animal products are eligible
for protection.
AGR-Lite differs from AGR in several
ways with the most notable being that there is
no limitation on the percentage amount of
receipts from animals or animal products for
AGR-Lite. AGR limits the allowable farm
income (AFI) from livestock to 35% of total
allowable farm income. This makes it much
more useful for livestock producers, the focus
of this study. Other differences include a
maximum policy liability of $1 million for
AGR-Lite, whereas maximum policy liability
is $6.5 million for AGR, and commodities
with small revenues can be grouped to de-
termine diversification credits for AGR-Lite
(not allowed for AGR).
AGR-Lite may be used as a standalone
product or as an umbrella (wraparound) policy
allowing producers to use AGR-Lite in con-
junction with alternative insurance policies,
excluding AGR. Limitations of AGR-Lite
specify that a qualifying person can generate
no more than 50% of their total revenue from
commodities purchased for resale. It is impor-
tant to note the resale limitation does not apply
to commodities purchased for further growth
such as stockers, cattle that are backgrounded,
and fed cattle. This insurance product, although
complicated, has a more simplified design than
AGR but still provides revenue protection for
all crop and livestock enterprises.
Exploring the use of crop insurance as a risk
management instrument and its significance in
the agricultural industry has been widely
researched.1 Yield-based designs have been
studied by Atwood, Watts, and Baquet (1996),
Carriker et al. (1991), Miranda (1991), Patrick
and Rao (1989),Wang et al. (1998), andWilliams
et al. (1993). Analysis of various revenue designs
includes work by Dismukes and Coble (2006),
Dismukes and Durst (2006), Feuz (2009),
Llewelyn et al. (2003), Miller, Coble, and
Barnett (2000), Mishra and Goodwin (2006),
Richardson, Smith, and Knutson (2001),
Schnitkey, Sherrick, and Irwin (2003),
Schumann et al. (2001), Stokes, Nayda, and
English (1997), and Turvey (2010).
Barham et al. (2011) used Stochastic Effi-
ciency with Respect to a Function (SERF)
analysis to evaluate strategies for managing
cotton revenue risk on irrigated cotton farms in
Texas. They found crop insurance strategies to
mitigate risk were preferred at lower levels of
irrigation with the use of crop insurance de-
clining as irrigation levels increased. This
analysis did not include revenue from livestock.
Schnitkey, Sherrick, and Irwin (2003) used
net costs, values-at-risk (VaRs), and certainty-
equivalent returns (CERs) to evaluate alter-
native crop insurance mechanisms including
actual production history (APH), revenue as-
surance (RA) with base-price option (RABp),
RA with harvest-price option (RAHp), group
risk plan (GRP), and group risk income pro-
tection (GRIP). Mishra and Goodwin (2006) used
cash grain farm data from the 1998 Agricultural
1Beginning in 2011, the Risk Management Agency
(RMA) renamed many of the crop insurance products
with only minimal changes made to them. Multiple-
Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) was renamed Yield Pro-
tection insurance (YP) in the Common Crop Insurance
Policy (CCIP) and is the longest running insurance
design, providing protection for individual commodi-
ties. Income Protection (IP) and Revenue Assurance
without the harvest price (RA) were combined into
a single product with minimal changes and renamed
Revenue Protection with the Harvest Price Excluded
(RP-HPE). RMA also combined Crop Revenue Cov-
erage (CRC) and Revenue Assurance with the harvest
price option included (RA-HP) with nominal changes
and renamed the product Revenue Protection (RP).
The Group Risk Products were not renamed. The
literature generally refers to these products by their
previous product names before 2011.
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Resource Management Study and a logit model
to determine factors that affect purchase of
revenue insurance. Factors affecting the decision
included age, education, production and mar-
keting contracts, gross farm sales, land tenure,
debt-to-asset ratio, returns to revenue insurance,
and government program participation.
Preferences and purchase decisions for hy-
pothetical livestock price insurance products
were evaluated for beef producers in Louisiana
using survey data and conjoint analysis (Fields
and Gillespie, 2008). Producers who expressed
greater preference for purchasing these prod-
ucts were more risk-averse and preferred these
products when prices were expected to vary in
the near future. The hypothetical products in-
cluded in the analysis were price insurance only
and did not include whole-farm revenue in-
surance like AGR-Lite.
Limited research has been conducted on
whole-farm revenue insurance options. Stokes,
Nayda, and English (1997) indicate that for
a representative Tennessee farm, gross revenue
assurance on a whole-farm basis is less ex-
pensive than a weighted average of assurance
prices on an individual-crop basis because of
price and yield covariability between crops
produced. Richardson, Smith, and Knutson
(2001) examined whole-farm revenue plans
for representative farms using simulated in-
come data. Schumann et al. (2001) explored
alternative safety net programs, including Cat-
astrophic (CAT) coverage, multi-peril crop in-
surance (MPCI), Whole-Farm Revenue Program
(WFRP), and Farm and Ranch Risk Manage-
ment (FARRM) accounts. Llewelyn et al. (2003)
also explored the impact of FARRM accounts
on net income and variability.
Dismukes and Durst (2006) report that an
important issue in the design of whole-farm
revenue insurance is the complexity of factors
that determine farm income and how those
factors vary across farms and time. They be-
lieve whole-farm revenue insurance is difficult
to administer. Dismukes and Coble (2006,
p. 26) also state that ‘‘How well a farm’s his-
torical income indicates expected income in
the insurance year is also critical.’’ Changes to
the farm that affect income are a function of the
amount of land and how the land is used and
not only production and price variability. They
go on to note that complex rules, which are
included in this study, have been developed for
measuring revenue and validating losses under
AGR-Lite. Turvey (2010) examined the effect
of whole-farm insurance on farm portfolio
choice with math programming models for
a representative Manitoba crop farm. The study
reports that farm managers will alter farm plans
significantly in response to the type of insurance
and take on production risks they would not
otherwise take.
Little work has been completed that exam-
ines the effectiveness of AGR-Lite for reducing
risk. Feuz (2009) compared cash pricing to
using futures, options, or AGR-Lite for man-
aging risk for a cow-calf producer, finding that
AGR-Lite was not an effective policy for cow-
calf producers. The analysis was based on a
cow-calf enterprise budget using simulation
analysis but did not consider whole-farm data
from tax returns as AGR-Lite requires.
This research is unique because it uses ac-
tual detailed farm data to reproduce the in-
formation needed to use AGR-Lite. Dismukes
and Durst (2006, p. 1) state that, ‘‘there is no
broad program of income support or insurance
for livestock.’’ Therefore, this research con-
centrates on beef farms because AGR- Lite
potentially can provide more risk protection to
beef farms than has been available for them
previously.
The impact of participation in AGR-Lite is
evaluated for southeast Kansas beef farms on
net farm income (NFI) variability. Kansas Farm
Management Association (KFMA) data are
used to compile 18 years (1993–2010) of con-
tinuous farm-level data, which is then used to
evaluate participation in AGR-Lite (Langemeier,
2010). These farms obtained more than 50% of
their average total income from beef produc-
tion over the 18 years.
According to census data for 2007, Kansas’
top six commodities (by production value) ac-
count for $14.3 billion or 99% of the state’s
agricultural production (U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture [USDA], 2009). However, only one of
these commodities is widely insured: grains, with
$4.5 billion, accounting for 31.6% of Kansas’
agricultural production. The commodities that
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historically are uninsured in the top six (by
production value) are cattle and calves, $8.5
billion; hogs, $506.4 million; milk and other
dairy, $376.5 million; hay and other pro-
duction, $253.9 million; and nursery and
greenhouse, $77.0 million. These historically
uninsured commodities account for $9.8 billion,
or over 68% of agricultural production in
Kansas. These statistics further substantiate the
need for analysis of AGR-Lite.
AGR-Lite Overview
AGR-Lite is the first Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation (FCIC) program to provide cov-
erage for crops, animals, and other previously
uninsurable commodities under one product by
insuring whole-farm revenue. Producers must
file an intended agricultural commodity report,
to be submitted at the beginning of each eligi-
ble insurance year detailing the commodity,
expected acreage, yield, expected value, and
total value. Qualifying farms must also submit
a minimum of five years of continuous, verifi-
able tax records for the same entity, preferably
Schedule F 1040 filings or equivalent tax forms
to document historical revenue and expenses
and, before January 31 of the insurance year
(March 15 for new applications), must file be-
ginning inventory for that insurance year, in-
cluding crops in storage and accounts payable
and receivable. These records are then used to
calculate the critical values, as described in
further detail subsequently.
The revenue guarantee is determined using
the approved AGR, which is based on the lesser
of the five-year average or indexed AGR
(whichever is applicable) from tax returns or
the expected farm income for the current in-
surance year. Expected farm income is derived
from the intended agricultural commodity re-
port. The revenue guarantee level or loss-
inception point is equal to the approved AGR
multiplied by the selected coverage level.
When a producer realizes a shortfall in gross
revenue below the guarantee level, an in-
demnity is paid on the difference based on the
producer’s selected payment rate percentage.
AGR-Lite includes procedures for indexing
and factoring to account for expansion or
contraction in farm size. With the ability of
farm managers to shift income from year to
year, accrual adjustments are used during the
claim submission process to ensure income is
appropriately assigned to the year in which it is
produced. After the necessary adjustments,
producers are eligible to receive an indemnity
when adjusted gross revenue to count (AGRC)
for the current insurance year falls below the
guaranteed level. This policy is described in
USDA (2008, 2010). Procedures used to con-
struct the critical values are described in greater
detail in an appendix in Williams et al. (2013).
Equation numbers beginning with the letter
included in parentheses in the ‘‘Data and
Methodology’’ section refer to equations in the
detailed appendix.
AGR-Lite Critical Values
AFI is the income measure used for establish-
ing the AGR-Lite guarantee (liability) and in-
cludes, by definition, any income generated
from the production of insurable commodities
less any added value resulting from post-
production activities. The calculation of AFI
includes items 1e, 2b, 3b, 5a, 5c, and 8b from
Schedule F. Ineligible income sources excluded
from AFI calculations are federal or state fuel
tax credits and refunds, cooperative dividends,
custom hire (machine work), agricultural pro-
gram payments, Farm Service Agency (FSA)
loans, Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance
Program (NAP) payments, ad hoc disaster as-
sistance, and crop insurance payments as well
as a few other minor categories of income.
AGR-Lite requires farm managers to maintain
accurate and comprehensive expense records.
Although AGR-Lite guarantees gross income,
expense records are maintained to detect
downsizing farms and monitor for the presence
of moral hazard. Expense records are analyzed
as part of the claim submission process, and the
insured’s guarantee is subject to adjustments.
Allowable Expense (AE) includes Schedule
F expenses directly associated with the pro-
duction of insurable commodities (lines 10–14,
16–20, 22, 25–28, and 30–32). Expenses that
do not directly influence production or gross
income are not included.
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The AGR-Lite program is complex and thus
requires very detailed data from the insured.
This complexity may be at least part of the
reason that relatively few policies have been
sold in Kansas or nationally despite the po-
tential benefit of insuring against production
risks and basis risks, which are not mitigated by
other insurance products for livestock that only
cover price risk. This study evaluates the effect
of AGR-Lite on risk reduction and net farm
income for actual beef farms in southeast
Kansas, seeking to determine if the policy may
have benefits for producers despite the com-
plexity involved with using it.
Data and Methodology
A panel data set for 49 southeast Kansas beef
farms for the period of 1993–2010 is used to
evaluate the impact of AGR-Lite on NFI vari-
ability. These data are obtained from the
KFMA data set, which was expanded in 1993
with additional variables including those re-
quired for this analysis (Langemeier, 2010).
The KFMA data are used to calculate the
income and expense values necessary for AGR-
Lite, including: AFI, AE, Change in Prepaid
Expenses (DPE), Change in Accounts Receiv-
able (DAR), Change in Inventories (DIN), and
NFI. These values are determined for each farm
for every year from 1993 through 2010. Using
these variables, distributions for indemnity
payments, AFI, AGRC, and NFI with and
without participation in the AGR-Lite program
for the years 1999–2010 are generated. To
model the AGR-Lite program, two data sets are
required. The first data set, including years
1993–2010, is required to compile the neces-
sary information to generate five-year Adjusted
Gross Revenue Average (AGRA) and AE from
equations A2 and A8. A second subset of the
data, from 1999–2010, is assembled to com-
pute accrual adjustments (DAR, DIN, and DPE)
and NFI.
All farms were screened to ensure there
were no negative values for AFI, which is
a gross income measure, AE, Prepaid Expenses
(PE), and Accounts Receivable (AR) and that
none exceeded the maximum liability coverage
allowed. The 49 farms have, on average, 696
acres of cropland and 1847 acres of pasture.
Figure 1 illustrates the average values of AFI,
NFI, and Value of Farm Production (VFP) for
the 49 farms remaining after screening for data
errors from 1993 through 2010. One of the
critical variables in the AGR-Lite policy is
adjusted gross revenue to count (AGRC). Its
value is reported in Figure 1 beginning in 1999
Figure 1. Trend in Income Variables for 49 Southeast Kansas Beef Farms from 1993 through
2010
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as a result of the structure of the policy and
availability of continuous data beginning in
1993. The policy requires five years of data
ending two years before the insurance year.
Although the KFMA data do not contain in-
dividual tax records, annual farm-level data
from 1993–2010 is used to reproduce the tax
schedule information necessary to evaluate AGR-
Lite using NFI distributions with and without
participation in the AGR-Lite program. The
following sections provide further explanations
of calculation procedures.
Allowable Income
A five-year average of AFI is calculated for
each insurance year over the study period. The
years 1993–1997 are used to determine the
five-year base for the insurance year 1999, as
required by the policy. For year 2000, the five-
year average uses years 1994–1998. For each
subsequent year, the five-year average shifts
forward one year. Thus, an individual enrolling
in 2010 would derive AFI and Adjusted Gross
Revenue Average (AGRA) using base years
2004–2008. AGRA is computed based on his-
torical records and remains the same, unless
indexing adjustments are required, as described
subsequently.
Indexing
Indexing is used to ensure effective coverage.
At each annual enrollment, calculations are
performed to monitor the farm’s growth to
detect whether adjustments are warranted. El-
igibility for indexing occurs when AFI from
either of the two most recent years in the base
period in the five-year average and the Expec-
ted Income (EI) reported on the annual farm
report required by AGR-Lite exceed the five-
year average. As part of the enrollment process,
farm managers submit annual farm reports,
which indicate the intended commodities to be
produced, anticipated production (based on av-
erage yield), and a forecasted income from each
commodity (based on current market value or
contracted value).
When conditions for indexing are satisfied
(as defined previously), a series of calculations
are performed to reveal the extent to which the
farm guarantee is adjusted (equations A3–A5)
to prevent ‘‘under- and overinsuring.’’ Using
indexing procedures, the Approved Adjusted
Gross Revenue (AAGR) is established. AAGR
is the value used in establishing contract lia-
bility and calculating the insurance premium.
Coverage Levels and Payment Rates
AGR-Lite offers three Coverage Levels (CLs)
(65%, 75%, and 80%) with indemnity Payment
Rates (PR) of 75% or 90% of AGR. The cov-
erage level is the level of AAGR at which in-
demnity payments begin. Multiplying AAGR
by the CL provides the loss-inception rate. The
payment rate determines how much the pro-
ducer will be paid for each dollar below the loss
inception point. A producer selects one amount
of coverage that will cover all commodities.
For each combination of CL and PR, the policy
caps maximum liability (equation A6). AGR-
Lite liability (AGRL) is calculated by multi-
plying AAGR by the selected CL and PR or,
alternatively, the loss-inception point multi-
plied by PR. These maximum liabilities repre-
sent the maximum AAGR an individual may
generate and still trigger an indemnity for
AGR-Lite. USDA (2010) provides a summary
of coverage levels, payment rates, minimum
number of commodities, and maximum annual
income limitations for the current AGR-Lite
policy.
Expense Indexing and/or Factoring
Farm managers must maintain accurate records
of expense activity throughout the insurance
year. Although AEs have no impact on deter-
mining the initial guarantee, because the con-
tract guarantees gross rather than net income,
expense records are used at various phases of
the insurance process. Furthermore, AE ac-
counting works to reduce the incidence of in-
dividuals engaging in moral hazard (equation
A7). In some instances, AE will ultimately re-
sult in adjustments to the guarantee level.
Similar to AFI, a base period is established to
derive a five-year Allowable Expense Average
(AEA). Consistent with AFI, the AE base period
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includes five years beginning two years before
the insurance year (equation A8).
Approved Allowable Expenses (AAE), for
the current insurance year, are dependent on
procedures applied to AFI (equations A9–
A12). When conditions for income indexing
are satisfied (when two of the most recent years
in the base period exceed the five-year aver-
age), an expense indexing trend factor is cal-
culated (using a similar procedure discussed
previously for AFI). When income indexing
occurs, factoring up ensures a proportional
adjustment in expenses and determines Factored
Allowable Expenses (FAE) for the current
insurance year. Alternatively, where income
indexing does not occur, expenses may be
‘‘factored down’’ proportionally to capture a
reduction in farm size. Factoring down recog-
nizes that as AFI declines, AE may also be less.
Factoring down will occur when AAGR is less
than AGRA.
Indemnity Calculation
An AGR-Lite indemnity is calculated using the
following procedure. Production Expense Per-
centage (PEP) for the current insurance year is
calculated by dividing the sum of AE for the
insurance year, the change in Accounts Payable
(DAP), and the change in Prepaid Expenses
(DPE) (equation A13). The values DAP and
DPE provide oversight on the expense activity
of the farm. Consideration of accrual adjust-
ments ensures proper allocation of expenses to
the year in which they are used to generate in-
come. PEP is used to determine whether an ad-
justment to AAGR ensues (equations A13–A16).
When AAGR warrants adjustment, recalcu-
lation of AGR Loss Inception Point (AGRLIP)
occurs by multiplying ADJAAGR by the elec-
ted CL (equation A17). Subsequently, AGRC
for the insurance year (equation A18) is derived
and then subtracted from the guarantee to de-
termine if a revenue deficiency occurs for the
farm (equation A19).
AGRC is calculated using AFI, DAR, DIN,
Noninsured Disaster Assistance Payments
(NAP), Net Gain from Commodity Hedging
(NGCH), Gross Crop Insurance Indemnity
Payments (GCIIP), Sugarbeet Payment-in-Kind
(SPIK), and Marketing Orders-cranberry and
tart cherries (MO) (equation A18). NAP pay-
ments are excluded from AFI but included in
AGRC. GCIIP are also included in determining
AGRC for the current insurance year but ex-
cluded from AFI. These payments are included
in AGRC as a preventative measure against
‘‘double-dipping,’’ collecting for the same loss
twice. Given that an individual sustained a
revenue deficiency, an Indemnity (ID) is paid to
the extent the payment rate allows, 75% or 90%
of AAGR (equation A20).
Premium Calculation
To determine an overall net gain or loss from
AGR-Lite, consideration must be given to the
cost of the policy or premium. We evaluate
AGR-Lite as a standalone product rather than
a ‘‘wraparound’’ policy. AGR-Lite could be
purchased to wrap around a standard Yield
Protection (YP) policy to cover risks not in-
sured by the YP policy. Furthermore, we as-
sume annual enrollment each year over the
entire study period. Following the procedure by
Williams et al. (1993), the average premium
rate (APR) is calculated by dividing total in-
demnities by total liabilities for all farms re-
ceiving at least one indemnity over the 12-year
period and is equal to 2.62% (equation A21).
The loss ratio for this group of farms is 1.0,
whereas the loss ratio for the group of all farms
is less than 1.0. The loss ratio is the total in-
demnity payments divided by total premiums
for the period of time considered. This calcu-
lated percentage rate is then applied to each
farm’s liability each year to determine the
theoretical premium charged in the study. This
insurance rate is for the pool of insured. Few
actuaries would argue the rate is always ‘‘fair’’
for the individual insured but only ‘‘fair’’ for the
pool of those insured (those with similar risks).
Government subsidization, administrative fees,
and catastrophic rate loading are not considered
in the premium. Because this is a very short
time period for any rate setting and with a lack
of observed losses, it is unlikely any real rate
would be set below this calculated proxy rate.
The average premium rate charged by the Risk
Management Agency (RMA) for all AGR-Lite
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policies sold in 2012 was 4.3% plus the ad-
ministrative and operating expense reimburse-
ment that is paid to the insurance provider
(USDA, 2012b). Past RMA experience has
demonstrated that a new product with limited
data will often generate rates below the ob-
served loss cost for the product. This is often
true because of a moral hazard that was over-
looked or adverse selection where only the
riskier producers buy the coverage. This study
demonstrates that some of the producers in the
pool would not buy the coverage based on their
historical experience and justifies why only
farmers with an observed loss were included in
the proxy rate. However, there is less concern
that the rate is less than it should be in this case
because the risk of a widespread catastrophic
loss from farms, which include more than 50%
of their income from livestock, is less relative
to crop farms. Feuz (2009) also concludes that
AGR-Lite premiums are set too high relative to
the risks that are insured. The average 2012
RMA rate of 4.3% is also used in addition to the
2.62% rate to determine its impact on prefer-
ences for using AGR-Lite.
Data Limitations and Assumptions
Provisions of the AGR-Lite contract specify
certain agricultural program payments are in-
cluded in the AGRA calculation, but not for
AGRC and vice versa. Only payments received
from Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC
Loans), Sugarbeet (Payment-in-kind), and
Marketing Orders are considered allowable
income and accounted for when calculating
AGRC. Lastly, Noninsured Crop Disaster As-
sistance Program payments (NAP) are not in-
cluded in AGRA calculations but are included
in AGRC. Although agricultural program
payments are recorded in the KFMA data set,
all proceeds are consolidated into one value.
Therefore, NAP payments, Payment in Kind,
Marketing orders, and CCC loans could not be
isolated when deriving AFI or AGRC. There-
fore, any agricultural program payments needed
for calculating AGRA or AGRC are omitted.
As discussed previously, the AGR-Lite guar-
antee is based on the lesser of AGRA, IAGR, or
EI from the annual farm report. Because the
analysis uses historical data (1993–2010), it is
not possible to determine EI for succeeding
years. Therefore, EI was set equal to AGRA.
Breeding livestock depreciation is not
recorded in the KFMA database, causing this
expense to be excluded from the expense cal-
culations. The AGR-Lite contract states that
raised cull cows that are sold are included in
AFI and AGRA. Alternatively, sales of cows
and other capital assets (such as breeding
livestock) are not included in AFI or AGRA.
This presents an issue because the KFMA data
do not allow the identification of corresponding
costs (nor do most farm accounting systems)
associated with livestock sales for any given
year. Thus, sales of cows (breeding livestock)
have been excluded from AGR-Lite calcula-
tions. Therefore, sales of livestock may not
truly reflect income permitted by the policy.
Despite these limitations, the farm-level data
used in this study from the KFMA database
represent a substantial improvement over what
has been used in previous analyses, which have
primarily used budgeting and simulation methods
and more closely represent what most farm
managers will have in their records relative to
other studies. The variety of net return patterns
exhibited in the actual data can be difficult to
simulate. Although farm managers will have
information to complete the cash-based IRS
Form 1040, Schedule F, many of them will
have little if any data in accrual form on changes
in accounts payable, accounts receivable, and
inventories.
The analysis is completed under the fol-
lowing assumptions: first, that each farm qual-
ifies for AGR-Lite coverage; second, each farm
insures every year; and third, every farm selects
the 75% coverage level and a 90% payment
rate. This coverage level is the most common
level selected by purchasers of AGR-Lite
(USDA, 2012a). Purchasers of revenue prod-
ucts also often choose the highest price or
payment rate; therefore, the 90% payment rate
is used rather than 75%. Premiums are used that
allow comparison of risk reduction effective-
ness of the program, excluding administrative
costs, insurance firm profits, and subsidies. To
measure the potential risk reduction from partic-
ipation in AGR-Lite, means, standard deviations,
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minimums, and stochastic efficiency with re-
spect to a function analysis are used to examine
net farm income distributions with and without
participation in AGR-Lite.
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function
According to Hardaker et al. (2004), stochastic
efficiency with respect to a function (SERF)
orders a set of risky alternatives in terms of
certainty equivalents (CEs) for a specified risk
preference. Strategies with higher CEs are
preferred to those with lower CEs. The CE of
a risky strategy is the amount of money at
which the decision-maker is indifferent be-
tween the certain dollar value and the risky
strategy. For a risk-averse decision-maker, the
estimated CE is less than the expected value of
the risky strategy.
The calculation of the CE depends on the
utility function specified. Given a negative ex-
ponential utility function, which is used in this
analysis, a specific absolute risk-aversion co-
efficient (ARAC) defined by Pratt (1964) as,
ra(w) 5 –u99(w)/u9(w), which represents the
ratio of derivatives of the decision-maker’s
utility function, u(w), is used to derive CEs.
Refer to Hardaker et al. (2004) for additional
detail on the calculation of the CEs with a
negative exponential utility function.
A negative exponential utility function used
in the SERF analysis conforms to the hypoth-
esis that managers prefer less risk to more given
the same expected return. This functional form
assumes managers have constant absolute risk-
aversion. Under this assumption, managers
view a risky strategy for a specific level of risk-
aversion the same without regard for their level
of wealth. Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman
(1993) note that this functional form is often
used to analyze farmers’ decisions under risk.
For additional justification for this functional
form, refer to Schumann et al. (2004). Their
work demonstrates that the negative exponen-
tial function can be used as a reasonable ap-
proximation of risk-averting behavior.
The net return data for each strategy is
sorted into CDFs, which are used in the SERF
analysis. A utility-weighted risk premium (RP),
given risk-aversion, can be calculated using
equation 1 once the strategies are ranked using
the CE results. This is accomplished by sub-
tracting the CE of a less preferred strategy (L)
from the preferred strategy (P).
(1) RPP,L,ra ¼ CEP,ra ðwÞ  CEL,ra ðwÞ
The RP, a utility-weighted risk premium for
a risk-averse decision-maker, reflects the mini-
mum amount ($/acre) that will have to be paid
to a decision-maker to justify a switch from
alternative P to L (Hardaker et al., 2004). As
the degree of risk-aversion increases, the risk
premium changes. When the risk premiums are
positive in this analysis, AGR-Lite is preferred
to no insurance. The range of ARAC values is
reported for each farm where the RP is positive.
These ARACs are compared with an upper-
bound ARAC for each farm based on a sug-
gested upper bound by Anderson and Dillon
(1992). They proposed a relative risk-aversion
(RRAC) definition of 0.0 as risk-neutral and 4.0
as extremely risk-averse. Thus, as suggested by
Hardaker et al. (2004), the upper range of an
absolute risk-aversion ARAC for use with
a negative exponential utility function is cal-
culated by dividing 4.0 by an appropriate level
of wealth. In this case, the measure of wealth is
the 2010 whole-farm net worth for each re-
spective farm used in the analysis (Langemeier,
2010). Simulation and Econometrics to Analyze
Risk (SIMETAR) developed by Richardson,
Schumann and Feldman (2008) is used to con-
duct the SERF analysis.
Results
AGR-Lite is examined for its risk reduction
potential using NFI distributions with and
without AGR-Lite based on a premium with a
loss ratio of 1.0 for those farms with indem-
nities, assuming a 75% coverage level and 90%
payment rate. Fifteen of the 49 farms do not
receive a single indemnity payment (Table 1).
Fifteen farms receive one indemnity payment,
whereas the remaining farms receive two to
five payments during the 12-year analysis pe-
riod. Average liabilities are highest for the
single-payment farms. With an average pre-
mium rate of 2.62% applied to all farms, the
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average annual premium is $4090 per farm
with a range of $398–$17,473 per farm.
Summary characteristics of each of the
farms’ net farm income distribution are repor-
ted in Table 2. AGR-Lite reduces the mean and
standard deviation of net farm income on av-
erage for the group, but not each individual
farm. It also raises the average minimum and
lowers the average maximum observations of
the net income distribution for the entire group
of farms.
The SERF analysis reveals that 21 farms do
not prefer AGR-Lite under any level of risk
aversion as indicated by NP in the first segment
of column two of Table 2. Of the 21 farms, 15
do not receive a single indemnity payment and
five others receive a single payment (5, 6, 17,
25, and 39). These single payments are not
enough to cause their NFI with AGR-Lite for
that year to be equal to or higher than without
AGR-Lite. One farm (23) receives two indem-
nity payments, but again these payments are not
enough to cause its NFI with AGR-Lite for the
two years to be equal to or higher than without
AGR-Lite. As a result, the cumulative distri-
bution of NFI without AGR-Lite is always lo-
cated completely to the right of the cumulative
distribution of NFI with AGR-Lite for these
21 farms.
An upper-bound ARAC was calculated for
each farm as described previously. A ‘‘yes’’ in
the first segment of column 2 of Table 2 in-
dicates the farm prefers AGR-Lite at an ARAC
value less than the individual farm upper bound
ARAC. A ‘‘no’’ indicates the farm prefers
AGR-Lite at an ARAC above the upper bound
ARAC. NP indicates the farm never prefers
AGR-Lite at any level of risk aversion.
The SERF analysis indicates that 28 farms
prefer AGR-Lite at some level of risk-aversion
(Table 2, column 2, segment 1). Eleven of these
28 farms prefer AGR-Lite at all levels of risk-
aversion above 0.0. Of the remaining 17 farms,
5 farms (e.g., farm 2) prefer AGR-Lite between
an ARAC of 0.0 and some positive upper value.
The upper positive value occurs for the five
farms because the minimum outcomes with
AGR-lite are more negative or less positive than
those without AGR-Lite but the indemnities
raise the mean NFI for these farms. For the
remaining 12 farms, the ARACs where AGR-
Lite first becomes preferred are well above
0.0. As described previously, an upper-bound
ARAC for each farm is also applied to these
farms. For ten of the 12 farms in which the
minimum ARAC for preferring AGR-Lite is
greater than 0.0, the minimum ARAC for the
farm is above the farm specific upper-bound
ARAC. For example, farm 43 (Table 2) prefers
AGR-Lite at ARACs of 0.0000152676 and
above, but the upper-bound ARAC for this farm
is less than this value. Therefore, only 18 farms
prefer AGR-Lite at levels of risk-aversion at or
below the specific farm’s upper-bound ARAC.
Although the SERF procedure provides a
more thorough analysis of the preference for
Table 1. Summary by Frequency of Claim for 49 Southeast Kansas Beef Farms
Years with
Indemnity
Number of
Farms
Average
Premium Paida
Average
Liabilityb
Mean Standard
Deviation of
Liabilityc
Average
Indemnity/
Farm/Yeard
0 15 $4,409 $168,486 $42,979 $0
1 15 $5,247 $200,518 $30,810 $26,208
2 11 $3,239 $123,759 $26,764 $27,932
3 4 $2,663 $101,757 $13,424 $22,183
4 1 $3,457 $132,121 $27,938 $22,419
5e 3 $1,934 $73,913 $20,734 $16,498
a Average premium paid by farm for each frequency of indemnity group based on a premium rate of 2.62% for all farms.
b Average liability was computed by averaging the liability across farms for each frequency of claim.
c Mean standard deviation of liability was calculated by taking the average of the standard deviation of liability by farm.
d Average indemnity per farm per year was calculated using the following formula: ([sum of indemnities]/[number of farms]/
years with indemnity).
e No farms had more than five years with indemnity payments. Each farm was in the program 12 years.
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AGR-Lite by each individual farm, 11 of the 18
farms that prefer AGR-Lite with SERF have
lower standard deviations and higher minimum
observations of NFI. Ten farms have lower
standard deviations, higher minimums, and
lower maximums. Two of the 18 farms have a
lower mean, standard deviation, maximum, and
higher minimum NFI with AGR-Lite.
We also provide the results of SERF anal-
ysis for a subsidized premium rate of 1.94% for
the pool of farms, which is the subsidized rate
for all AGR-Lite contracts in 2012 (Table 2,
column 2, segment 2). Three additional farms
(22, 30, and 45) prefer AGR-Lite with this
premium. Furthermore, additional SERF anal-
ysis results are provided for an actuarially fair
premium by farm (Table 2, column 2, segment
3). In this case, premiums equal indemnities for
each individual farm. Under this scenario, 15
farms that did not prefer AGR-Lite with the
2.62% pool premium rate now prefer AGR-
Lite. However, five farms that preferred AGR-
Lite under the 2.6% pool rate do not prefer
AGR-Lite with the actuarially fair rate by farm.
This resulted in 28 farms preferring AGR-Lite.
This can be seen by comparing the information
in Table 2, column 2, segments three and one.
Table 3 reports the results of the risk pre-
mium calculations for AGR-Lite under the
2.62% premium rate for the pool of farms. The
farm-level ARACs used range from 0.0 (risk-
neutral) to 0.00003 (very risk-averse). The
upper bound is the maximum ARAC calculated
for each of the 49 farms described earlier. This
insures that the upper bound is at least as large
as the individual ARACs for all 49 farms.
The resulting risk premiums for the farms
with no indemnities are all negative. In addi-
tion, the risk premiums are all negative for
farms 5, 6, 17, 23, 25, and 39. Positive risk
premiums indicate the farm manager prefers
AGR-Lite at the specific ARAC. Farms 2, 4,
27, 40, 42, 28, 29, 31, 37, 47, 7, 20, 38, 46, 3,
13, 21, and 49 prefer AGR-Lite at an ARAC
less than the upper-bound ARAC for the in-
dividual farm.
The trend in risk premiums for each indi-
vidual farm can be compared, but risk pre-
miums of different farms cannot. For example,
farm two has a risk premium of $3656 with
risk-neutrality and prefers AGR-Lite up to an
ARAC of 0.00000585, but at higher ARACs
does not prefer AGR-Lite, as demonstrated by
a risk premium of –$2317 at an ARAC of
0.00001 (Table 2). The negative risk premium
indicates the farm would need to be paid $2317
or have a higher NFI by that amount to prefer
AGR-Lite at the corresponding level of risk
aversion. Farm 40 prefers AGR-Lite at all
levels of risk aversion, as demonstrated by the
increasing positive risk premiums at each level
of risk aversion (Table 2). The positive risk
premiums indicate the farm would need to have
to have a lower NFI by those amounts at the
respective ARACs to not prefer AGR-Lite.
As risk aversion increases, the preference for
AGR-Lite increases. For the 18 farms that
prefer AGR-Lite at some level of risk aversion
below the farm’s maximum ARAC, the risk
premium increases as risk aversion increases
for 12 farms. This indicates that their prefer-
ence for the program increases as their risk
aversion increases. The risk premium decreases
as risk aversion increases for four farms and
there is no trend in risk premiums for two farms
that prefer AGR-Lite. For all nine farms that
prefer AGR-Lite at a risk aversion level above
the maximum ARAC for the respective farm,
the risk premium increases as risk aversion
increases. Each farm is a different size and has
different amounts of acres, head of cattle, and
other characteristics, so there is no way to
standardize the risk premiums to a per-acre or
per-head basis.
When the upper-bound ARACs for each
farm are applied using a RRAC of 6.33, as
suggested by Abdulkadri and Langemeier (2000),
the number of farms included in the set pre-
ferring AGR-Lite increases from 18 to 19.
When a RRAC of 12.0 is used, the set increases
to 20. Therefore, the selection of the upper-
bound RRAC to calculate the ARAC has little
effect on the results. Seven of the 11 that prefer
AGR-Lite at all levels of risk-aversion have
at least three indemnity payments during the
12-year period. In summary, the initial SERF
analysis shows 37% of the farm managers
prefer AGR-Lite.
The SERF analysis was repeated using net
farm income distributions with a premium rate
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Table 3. AGR-Lite Risk Premiums ($/farm)a
Number
of Indemnities Farm Number
Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficients
0.00000 0.00001 0.00002 0.00003
0 1 –$3,951 –$3,932 –$4,316 –$4,819
0 9 –$1,263 –$1,246 –$1,226 –$1,205
0 10 –$14,075 –$12,931 –$12,251 –$12,172
0 11 –$1,594 –$1,599 –$1,601 –$1,601
0 12 –$1,613 –$1,603 –$1,604 –$1,614
0 15 –$7,927 –$8,010 –$8,770 –$9,279
0 16 –$660 –$591 –$550 –$526
0 19 –$12,417 –$11,587 –$12,067 –$12,110
0 24 –$1,074 –$1,080 –$1,086 –$1,093
0 32 –$7,324 –$7,404 –$7,386 –$7,321
0 33 –$7,004 –$6,654 –$7,099 –$7,565
0 36 –$1,777 –$1,795 –$1,815 –$1,835
0 41 –$1,376 –$1,383 –$1,391 –$1,399
0 44 –$2,028 –$2,011 –$1,995 –$1,981
0 48 –$2,053 –$2,178 –$2,342 –$2,508
1 2 $3,656 –$2,317 –$5,474 –$6,266
1 4 –$7,549 $8,738 $15,315 $16,048
1 5 –$2,841 –$2,640 –$2,384 –$2,175
1 6 –$4,763 –$3,363 –$2,358 –$1,765
1 14 –$311 –$102 $135 $399
1 17 –$7,407 –$7,275 –$7,169 –$7,073
1 22 –$244 $74 $418 $775
1 25 –$16,472 –$16,873 –$17,655 –$18,044
1 27 –$1,388 $13,029 $34,293 $48,956
1 34 –$4,276 –$1,283 $1,539 $4,119
1 35 –$1,932 –$5 $2,216 $4,658
1 39 –$981 –$1,067 –$1,235 –$1,456
1 40 $366 $553 $754 $970
1 42 $2,942 $3,164 $3,359 $3,521
1 43 –$321 –$119 $113 $368
1 45 –$1,487 $1,615 $3,428 $3,602
2 8 –$1,015 –$530 $20 $576
2 18 –$2,802 –$2,046 –$1,670 –$1,308
2 23 –$1,477 –$1,010 –$645 –$396
2 26 –$1,258 –$860 –$385 $158
2 28 $6,036 –$4,499 –$9,704 –$11,390
2 29 $3,817 $7,244 $8,408 $7,340
2 30 –$462 –$52 $307 $583
2 31 $2,111 $5,526 $7,303 $7,975
2 37 $182 $184 $184 $182
2 47 $7,508 $4,543 $1,402 –$943
3 7 $209 $278 $350 $423
3 20 $2,024 $2,475 $2,955 $3,459
3 38 $4,692 $189 –$48 $905
3 46 $4,607 $5,865 $8,756 $12,630
4 3 $4,016 $4,037 $4,208 $4,482
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of 4.3%, the average unsubsidized rate of all
AGR-lite polices purchased in 2012. Under this
rate, only 12 farms (24.5%) prefer AGR-Lite at
levels of risk-aversion at or below the specific
farm’s upper-bound ARAC, or six farms less
than the 18 that prefer the plan under the lower
premium rate (results not reported in the article).
Summary and Conclusions
A panel data set of actual farm-level income
data and cost was compiled to evaluate the
impact of AGR-Lite on NFI variability for 49
southeast Kansas beef farms. Although actual
income tax records were not available, annual
data for the period 1993–2010 from the KFMA
were used to reproduce the essential infor-
mation from IRS Form 1040, Schedule F and
inventory records that a farm manager would
need to purchase AGR-Lite (Langemeier, 2010).
Five years of historical data were required to
perform the necessary calculations for the rev-
enue guarantee and to purchase AGR-Lite each
year. The data set allowed calculation of the
impact of the whole-farm revenue insurance for
the 12 years from 1999–2010 in contrast to pre-
vious research, which used simulation methods
to generate whole-farm returns.
Net farm income distributions for each farm
over this period were calculated for two strat-
egies: either the farm manager insured or did
not insure each year using AGR-Lite as a
standalone product using a premium rate with
a loss ratio of 1.0 for farms with indemnities.
Although farm managers could enroll in alter-
native insurance products each year and the
farm-level data did contain premium and in-
demnity payments, the data did not contain
enough detail to identify which products these
farms purchased. Necessary adjustments were
made to examine the impact of purchasing
AGR-Lite as a standalone product.
Income distributions of 12 observations for
each strategy were calculated. The AGR-Lite
analysis assumed a 75% coverage level and 90%
payment rate. Statistics indicating the effective-
ness of AGR-Lite at reducing net farm income
risk include changes in NFI, standard deviation,
and minimum outcomes. Stochastic Efficiency
with Respect to a Function was also used.
Participation in AGR-Lite raised the NFI of
16 of the 34 farms receiving at least one in-
demnity payment and reduced the standard
deviation of NFI on 27 of these 34 farms. It
raised the minimum net farm income of 23 of
the 34 farms. SERF results indicated that 37%
of the farm managers preferred AGR-Lite.
These results indicate that from a purely eco-
nomic standpoint, the policy may have tangible
benefits for some beef producers.
However, this examination of AGR-lite also
reveals some additional issues. Excluding in-
demnity payments in calculating AGRA but
including them in AGRC raises concerns that
the product fails to address multiple-year los-
ses. The revenue guarantee will decline in fu-
ture years if indemnity payments are received
but not included in AGRA, which effectively
reduces the level of guarantee offered by AGR-
Lite. Excluding indemnity payments from
AGRC seems logical because it prevents man-
agers from collecting for the same loss twice.
Alternatively, including indemnity payments in
AGRA and AGRC may be of some assistance
to managers experiencing multiple-year losses.
The AGR-Lite policy includes cull cow
sales in AGRA and AGRC. However, if cows
are sold as part of herd reduction (not techni-
cally culls), any receipts from these sales are
excluded from AGRC. This raises a question:
Table 3. Continued
Number
of Indemnities Farm Number
Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficients
0.00000 0.00001 0.00002 0.00003
4 13 $2,178 $2,069 $1,967 $1,870
5 21 $11,157 $12,406 $14,421 $17,040
5 49 $1,484 $2,014 $2,487 $2,825
a Risk premiums cannot be compared across farms because they are of different sizes and different characteristics.
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what is the criterion for determining the dif-
ference between cull-cow sales and herd re-
duction resulting from poor pasture or feed
availability resulting from drought? This was
a very real issue in 2011 and 2012 with the large
and severe drought in the southern Great Plains.
Purchased feed causes concern specifically
for livestock producers. In years of drought or
unfavorable yields, producers will likely pur-
chase feed from external sources. Such pur-
chases will not affect the calculation of AGRC,
which is used to determine the indemnity.
However, they will result in a reduction to net
income. Therefore, the manager will effec-
tively not be covered for such losses. Further-
more, farms that purchase feed will not find
AGR-Lite attractive. If they sold all of their
crop production and repurchased feed as
needed, the crop sales will be in gross income
and in poor crop years would be reflected in
a lower gross income for AGRC. Unless the
sale of the feed crops and repurchase are ‘‘arm’s
length transactions,’’ this could increase moral
hazard. A manager could create two separate
corporations: one for crop enterprises and the
other for livestock. In fact, this would be the
best way to insure under AGR-Lite because it
would remove all crops from the ‘‘farm’’ insured
with AGR-Lite. The ‘‘crop farm’’ would retain
any crop insurance program indemnities and
these would not be included in the AGR-Lite
calculations. The cattle sales calculation should
be changed to cattle sales less feed costs. This
would then provide more protection to those
farms that purchase feed. However, in practice,
each farm corporation would need to wait five
years to accumulate the required (separate) in-
come tax records to enroll in AGR-Lite. En-
rollment in AGR-Lite is by individual taxable
entity (USDA, 2007). This could be a significant
hurdle, which would at least delay enrollment.
Despite AGR-Lite being touted as easy to
understand, as a result of its design, this research
highlights its inherent complexity, which may
partially explain the relatively small use of the
policy by producers. Proponents contend that
given the use of IRS Form 1040, Schedule F,
minimal additional recordkeeping is required.
However, as presented in this study, thorough
records including accrual-based accounting of
inventories, accounts receivables, prepaid ex-
penses, and accounts payable in addition to
a cash-based Schedule F must be maintained
for filing purposes. Few farms may have the
additional data not required for Schedule F. In
addition, Schedule C corporation tax returns
contain less farm expense detail than the
Schedule F, thus requiring additional records.
AGR-Lite is also more likely to increase the
administrative cost for both RMA and the in-
surance provider. The complexity will require
more insurance agent time to ‘‘educate’’ the
producer on the product and to help the pro-
ducer identify the information needed for pur-
chase. The farm manager’s cost may increase if
an accountant is needed to prepare the data for
the insurance application. Effectively AGR-
Lite requires an accountant for loss-adjusting
rather than a traditional crop production loss-
adjuster. This research draws attention to po-
tential problem areas in addition to existing
concerns with purchased feed, exclusion of
indemnity payments, and breeding livestock.
Certain components of this policy have the
potential to establish AGR-Lite as an effective
risk management mechanism because it pro-
vides some income protection for the entire
farm. The findings of this study indicate that
risk reduction occurs on many of the beef
farms. However, managers must consider that
factors that lead to increased variability in NFI
but not gross income (which the policy covers)
ultimately limit the effectiveness of AGR-Lite
as a risk management tool. Therefore, AGR-
Lite may not be a viable risk management so-
lution for some farm managers. This factor as
well as the inherent complexity of the policy
may explain why few policies have been sold in
Kansas or nationally, despite the fact that it
does provide discernible risk-mitigation and
would be preferred by some producers based on
the results of this study.
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